The role of social grants in mitigating the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS: evidence from the Free State Province by Booysen, Frederik
 University of Cape Town 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL GRANTS IN 
MITIGATING THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FREE STATE 
PROVINCE 
 
 
 
 
 
Frederik Booysen 
 
 
 
 
CSSR Working Paper No. 56 
 
 
Published by the Centre for Social Science Research 
University of Cape Town  
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copies of this publication may be obtained from: 
 
The Administrative Officer 
Centre for Social Science Research 
University of Cape Town 
Private Bag 
Rondebosch, 7701 
Tel:  (021) 650 4656 
Fax: (021) 650 4657 
Email:  kforbes@cssr.uct.ac.za 
 
Price in Southern Africa (incl. VAT and postage):  R 15.00 
 
 or it can be downloaded from our website 
http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/cssr/pubs.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 0-7992-2228-3 
 
© Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, 2003
 
CENTRE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE 
RESEARCH 
 
 
 
Social Surveys Unit 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL GRANTS IN 
MITIGATING THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FREE STATE 
PROVINCE 
 
 
 
Frederik Booysen 
 
 
 
CSSR Working Paper No. 56 
 
December 2003 
Professor Frederik Booysen is a Visiting Research Fellow in the CSSR. He is 
attached to the Department of Economics and the Centre for Health Systems 
Research & Development at the University of the Free State.  
 
His fields of speciality are development economics and health economics, with 
a special focus on poverty and health and the economics of HIV/AIDS. 
 
This research project is sponsored jointly by USAID, DFID and AUSAID and 
administered by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies under 
subcontract JCNAT674-97-P006-02 from Nathan Associates. 
The Role of Social Grants in Mitigating 
the Socio-economic Impact of 
HIV/AIDS: Evidence from the  
Free State Province 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of social grants in mitigating the socio-
economic impact of HIV/AIDS using data from a panel designed to investigate 
the household impact of the epidemic. The child support, disability and foster 
care grants play an important role in mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS, given 
that eligibility for these grants is driven largely by the increasing burden of 
chronic illness, the mounting orphan crisis and the impoverishment of 
households associated with the epidemic. Yet, take-up of these grants remains 
low and much scope remains to improve take-up rates. Social grants also play 
an important role in alleviating poverty in affected households, resulting in 
significant declines in the severity of poverty. Income received from social 
grants also saw expenditure on food increase in affected households, while old-
age pensions saw household expenditure on education increase. Given that 
many orphaned and other children live in households headed by their 
grandparents, these transfers targeted at the elderly benefit children indirectly. 
This raises the question as to whether or not grants aimed at benefiting children 
should rather be administered via the education system in order to ensure that 
these transfers benefit children in a more direct way. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
South Africa faces one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world. The 
estimated adult prevalence of HIV amongst 15-49 year olds in 2001 was 20.1 
percent (UNAIDS, 2002), while the ASSA2000 model put adult prevalence 
amongst 20-65 year olds at 24.1 percent (ASSA, 2003). A recent national 
household survey in turn has put the 2002 estimate of adult prevalence amongst 
those older than 25 years at 15.5 percent (HSRC, 2002). The socio-economic 
impact of HIV/AIDS combines to create a vicious cycle of poverty and disease. 
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On the one hand, poverty enhances the vulnerability of people to HIV infection. 
Poverty, apart from being associated with poor nutrition and a breakdown of 
immune systems, also translates into unsafe sexual practices as a result of lack 
of knowledge and lack of access to means of protection. This is due to women’s 
inability to negotiate about condom use with sexual partners because of 
entrenched gender roles and power relations, or in other words the entrenched 
cultural beliefs and socio-cultural as well as economic constraints of condom 
use (Whiteside, 2001/02). Desmond (2001) and Whiteside (2002) also 
emphasise how labour migration induced by rural poverty can contribute to the 
spread of the disease and how poor, single mothers may be forced to become 
occasional sex workers in order to survive (Desmond, 2001; Poku, 2001). Gillies 
et al. (1996) and Nyamathi et al. (1996) highlight the importance of 
homelessness, urban/rural migration patterns, migrant labour practices and the 
breakdown of social support networks in communities with limited access to 
social services in increasing the vulnerability of poor people to HIV/AIDS. 
 
In turn, HIV/AIDS can also cause households or individuals to move into or 
deeper into poverty. As adult members of the household become ill and are 
forced to give up their jobs, household income will fall. To cope with the change 
in income and the need to spend more on health care, children are often taken 
from school to assist in caring for the sick or to work so as to contribute to 
household income. Because expenditure on food comes under pressure 
malnutrition often results, while access to other basic needs such as health care, 
housing and sanitation may also come under threat. This acts to further reduce 
the resistance of infected adults and children to opportunistic infections, given 
lower levels of immunity and knowledge; this in turn leads to increased 
mortality (World Bank, 1998; Bonnel, 2000; Wekesa, 2000; Gaffeo, 2003). 
Therefore, HIV/AIDS and the associated burdens of morbidity and mortality 
expose already vulnerable households to further shocks (Desmond, 2001; Poku, 
2001; Whiteside, 2002), hence locking those poor households, already infected 
and affected by the epidemic, in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment. Yamano 
and Jane (2002), Booysen (2003) and Cogneau and Grimm (2003) have reported 
empirical evidence on this positive link between poverty and HIV/AIDS. What 
role, then, have social grants to play in alleviating the burden of poverty on 
HIV/AIDS-affected households? 
 
South Africa has a well-developed system of social security compared to most 
other developing countries and is on a par with systems in many developed 
countries (Guthrie, 2002; Seekings, 2002). This system includes a non-
contributory pension system, as well as a number of social grants aimed at 
assisting households in caring for children and for the disabled. The discussion 
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in this paper distinguishes between five specific social grants (i.e. old-age 
pensions [R700], the child support grant [R160], disability grant [R700], care 
dependency grant [R700], and foster care grant [R500]), as well as access to 
grants in general (defined as access to any one of these five grants). Apart from 
the role of social grants in general in alleviating poverty, the old-age pension, 
child support, disability, care dependency, and foster care grants in particular are 
also likely to play an important part in mitigating the socio-economic impact of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, given the associated increase in morbidity and 
mortality, the orphan crisis and the resulting impacts on household composition 
and formation (Guthrie, 2002; Seekings, 2002; Van der Berg & Bredenkamp, 
2002). The old-age pension and the disability, care dependency and foster care 
grants furthermore are all relatively large grants (the current monthly Rand 
value of each of these grants as reported by the National Treasury (2003) are 
noted here in parentheses) and are therefore likely to play a particularly 
important role in supporting poor, affected households. 
 
This paper investigates the role of social grants in mitigating the socio-economic 
impact of HIV/AIDS with the aid of data from a panel designed to investigate 
the household impact of the epidemic. Section 1 presents an overview of the 
data and method.1 Following an overview of general trends in the number of 
grant beneficiaries in South Africa and the Free State province (section 2), 
section 3 reports on the contribution of social grants to total household income. 
Section 4 describes trends in access to social grants, while section 5 explores the 
role of social grants in alleviating poverty. Section 6 reports the results of 
regression analysis employed in exploring the determinants of grant income, the 
take-up of social grants, as well as the impact of social grants on household 
expenditure on food and education and on decisions regarding labour force 
participation. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The main advantage of panel data is that it allows the researcher to distinguish between 
households that over time have experienced certain events infrequently, i.e. at certain points 
in time only, as opposed to households that have not experienced any change in their 
circumstances, i.e. either never or at all points in time. For example, a panel survey allows 
one to consider the extent to which households move into and out of poverty over time, or 
alternatively remain in poverty (May et al., 2000; May & Roberts, 2001). Analysis that 
employs data from cross-sectional surveys conducted at different points in time to distinguish 
trends in key outcomes (often the only option in the absence of panel data) cannot explore this 
dynamic nature of household economics. 
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1.  Data and Method 
 
The household impact of HIV/AIDS was assessed by means of a cohort study of 
households affected by the disease. The survey was conducted in two local 
communities in the Free State province, one urban (Welkom) and one rural 
(QwaQwa), in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic is particularly rife. Comparisons 
are drawn between so-called affected households, affected households that have 
experienced a high burden of morbidity or mortality, and households that have 
not experienced morbidity or mortality in any period. Affected households were 
sampled purposively via NGOs and other organisations involved in AIDS 
counselling and care, and at baseline included at least one person known to be 
HIV-positive or known to have died from AIDS in the past six months. 
Informed consent was obtained from the infected individual(s) or their 
caregivers (in the case of minors). The incidence of morbidity and mortality is 
considerably high in affected households. The morbidity and mortality 
experienced by affected households exhibit a classic HIV/AIDS pattern, with 
large numbers of adults (i.e. those aged 15-49 years) having experienced illness 
or having died. Between 70 and 80 percent of morbidity and mortality in 
affected households can be attributed to HIV/AIDS or related infectious diseases 
and opportunistic infections (Bachmann & Booysen, 2003; Booysen et al., 
2003). In order to explore the socio-economic impact on affected households of 
repeated occurrences of HIV/AIDS-related morbidity or mortality, what Freire 
(2003: 373) calls the chronic impacts of the epidemic, a distinction is made 
between affected households in general and affected households that have 
experienced morbidity or mortality in three of four waves of the panel. Finally, 
households that have not experienced morbidity or mortality represent 
households living in close proximity to affected households. These households 
at baseline did not include persons suffering from tuberculosis or pneumonia 
and did not experience morbidity or mortality in any of the four waves of the 
panel (These households are not called 'non-affected households', as is the 
common practice, given that they may include HIV+ persons). The subsequent 
analyses, therefore, although based on data from a relatively small, purposive 
sample, present some indication of the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS on 
households. Yet, the classification of households employed in this analysis, 
albeit useful for the purposes of our analysis, belies the fact that HIV/AIDS 
affects entire communities and affects various households directly or indirectly 
at different stages of the epidemic, rather than affecting select groups only of 
households that directly experience morbidity and mortality (Freire, 2003). 
Households were defined in terms of the standard definition employed by 
Statistics South Africa in the October Household Survey (OHS), i.e. ‘a person or 
a group of persons who live together at least four nights a week at the same 
address, eat together and share resources’. A survey on the quality of life and 
  5
household economics was conducted. Interviews were conducted with one key 
respondent only, namely the ‘person responsible for the daily organisation of the 
household, including household finances’. The results reported in this paper are 
based on an analysis of data for the 351 households interviewed in each of the 
first four waves of the study. The four waves of data collection were 
respectively completed in May/June and November/December of 2001 and in 
July/August and November/December of 2002 (Eventually, a total of six waves 
will be conducted over a three-year period). Due to the sampling design and 
small sample size, the findings from this household impact study cannot be 
generalised to households across South Africa, but pertain largely to the 
experience of poor, African households that utilise public health care services 
(Booysen et al., 2003). Thus, the research is indicative only (but nevertheless 
telling) of the socio-economic impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, a 
characteristic shared by most other HIV/AIDS household impact studies 
(Booysen & Arntz, 2003). 
 
Standards of living are measured here at the household rather than the individual 
level, given that the focus here is on the household impact of HIV/AIDS. 
Poverty is here interpreted in terms of the command over commodities that 
resources afford people via income and consumption (Lipton & Ravallion, 
1995). The concern, therefore, is with 'poverty proper' (i.e. resource adequacy) 
and not with the physiological, sociological or political dimensions of poverty 
(Kgarimetsa, 1992; Woolard & Leibbrandt, 1999). One should note that the 
complex nature of the association between poverty and HIV/AIDS also requires 
that capability, social exclusion and participatory approaches to poverty 
eradication be focused on in this research topic, as argued by Stewart (2003), 
approaches that cannot be explored here due to the nature of the survey. During 
the survey, data were collected from one informant regarding the employment 
income, non-employment income (which includes social grants) and receipts of 
remittances for the members of their particular household. An estimate of total 
monthly household income was derived from these figures by adding up the 
various component items. Where appropriate, income estimates for the four 
waves were converted into real values using the most recent CPI estimates 
(2000=100) published by Statistics South Africa (2003a). 
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2. National and Provincial Trends in Numbers 
of Grant Beneficiaries 
 
In order to put the findings presented in this paper in a proper context, 
particularly the discussion on trends in access to grants in the sample population, 
this section presents a brief overview of trends in number of grant beneficiaries 
over the past five years. 
 
Figure 1: Number of grant beneficiaries in South African and Free State 
province (1998-2003) 
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Note: The number of grant beneficiaries per 1000 population was calculated by dividing the 
annual number of reported beneficiaries in April of each year by the respective midyear 
population estimate published by Statistics South Africa (2003b). These midyear population 
estimates include extra deaths due to HIV/AIDS. 
 
The total number of grant beneficiaries in South Africa increased from 2.8 to 5.8 
million between 1998 and 2003. In the case of the Free State province, this 
number increased from 181 to 366 thousand. In terms of grants per 1000 
population, national coverage increased from 67 to 125 (Figure 1). The relative 
increase in coverage was slightly more pronounced in the Free State province, 
where coverage increased from 66 to 134 grants per 1000 population. The 
average annual growth in the number of beneficiaries was 15 percent both for 
South Africa and the Free State province. Hence, the reach of the social grant 
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safety net has expanded relatively rapidly over this period in terms of the 
number of grant beneficiaries. However, this has not been the case with all 
social grants. Consequently, attention is now shifted to trends in coverage by 
grant type. This discussion is limited to the four social grants with the widest 
coverage (i.e. largest numbers of beneficiaries), namely the old-age pension and 
the child support, disability and foster care grants. The care dependency grant, 
although important in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, was excluded 
from the discussion in this paper due to the relatively small number of 
beneficiaries in the Free State province (2 474 by April 2003) as well as the 
relatively small number of households in the sample population that had access 
to a care dependency grant (n<10). 
 
Figure 2: Number of grant beneficiaries in South African by grant type 
(1998-2003) 
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Note: The number of grant beneficiaries per 1000 population was calculated by dividing the 
annual number of reported beneficiaries in April of each year by the respective midyear 
population estimate published by Statistics South Africa (2003b). These midyear population 
estimates include extra deaths due to HIV/AIDS. 
 
The number of persons receiving old-age pensions has increased from 1.7 to 2 
million over the period 1998-2003, which represents an average annual growth 
in coverage of 3 percent. In terms of grants per 1000 population, coverage 
increased from 40 to 43 grants (Figure 2). The next highest increase in coverage 
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has been in the number of persons benefiting from disability grants. The total 
number of beneficiaries has increased from 660 to 953 thousand over this 
period, translating into an average annual growth rate of almost 8 percent. In 
relative terms, coverage increased from 15 to 20 grants per 1000 population. The 
number of beneficiaries of foster care grants increased at an average annual rate 
of 26 percent over the five years, rising from 43 to 138 thousand between 1998 
and 2003. In relative terms, however, coverage is low compared to the old-age 
pension and child support grant, with 1 grant awarded per 1000 population in 
1998 compared to 3 in 2003. Most marked was the increase in the coverage of 
the child support grant over this relatively short period, as was highlighted by 
Guthrie (2002). The number of beneficiaries on average grew at 138 percent per 
annum, rising from 34 thousand in 1998 to a staggering 2.6 million by April 
2003. In 1998, when this grant was launched, only 1 grant was awarded per 
1000 population. This figure rose to 56 per 1000 population by 2003. 
 
Figure 3: Number of grant beneficiaries in Free State province by grant 
type (1998-2003) 
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Note: The number of grant beneficiaries per 1000 population was calculated by dividing the 
annual number of reported beneficiaries in April of each year by the respective midyear 
population estimate published by Statistics South Africa (2003b). These midyear population 
estimates include extra deaths due to HIV/AIDS. 
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Trends in the number of grant beneficiaries in the Free State province for the 
most part mirrors the national trends. The number of persons receiving old-age 
pensions increased from 109 to 122 thousand, growing at an average annual rate 
of 2 percent. In terms of grants per 1000 population, coverage increased from 40 
to 44 grants (Figure 3). The total number of persons benefiting from disability 
grants increased from 47 to 76 thousand over this period, translating into an 
average annual growth rate of 10 percent. In relative terms, coverage increased 
from 17 to 28 grants per 1000 population. The number of beneficiaries from 
foster care grants increased at an average annual rate of 36 percent over this 
period, rising from 3 to almost 15 thousand. In relative terms, however, 
coverage is low compared to the old-age pension and child support grant, with 1 
grant awarded per 1000 population in 1998 compared to 5 in 2003. As in the 
case of South Africa as a whole, the most marked increase in coverage occurred 
in the child support grant. Over this relatively short period, the number of 
beneficiaries on average grew at 140 percent per annum, rising from almost 2 
thousand to just over 150 thousand between 1998 and 2003. In 1998, when this 
grant was launched, only 1 grant was awarded per 1000 population. This figure 
rose to 55 per 1000 population by 2003 in the case of the Free State province. 
The number of disability and foster care grants awarded per 1000 population is 
slightly higher than was the case for South Africa as a whole. This may reflect 
the fact that the Free State province, which has a relatively high HIV prevalence 
rate compared to most other provinces (i.e. 27.6 percent adult prevalence 
according to ASSA 2003 model versus 14.9 percent adult prevalence according 
to HSRC, 2002), other things being equal, may have seen the number of 
beneficiaries increase at a more rapid rate than elsewhere given the greater 
impact of the epidemic in this particular province. 
 
 
3. Contribution of Social Grants to Total 
Household Income 
 
If social grants are to play an important role in mitigating the socio-economic 
impacts of the epidemic, one would expect affected households to be more 
dependent on income from social grants when compared to households that have 
not experienced morbidity or mortality. 
 
Table 1 reports the composition of total household income. Affected households 
in general and affected households that have experienced a greater burden of 
morbidity and mortality in particular were more dependent on social grants 
compared to households that have never experienced morbidity or mortality 
(P<0.005). A smaller proportion of the income of affected households that have 
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experienced morbidity or mortality in three of four periods consisted of 
employment income compared to households that have never experienced 
morbidity or mortality (P<0.005). The main explanation for this is the relatively 
high levels of unemployment and low labour force participation rates in affected 
households (Booysen et al., 2003), as well as the greater eligibility of affected 
households for social grants (discussed in section 4). Differences in the 
contribution to household income of other non-employment income and 
remittances were not statistically significant. Given the relatively high 
proportion of the income of affected households made up by social grants, it is 
likely that social grants play an important role in alleviating poverty in 
HIV/AIDS-affected households. Before the discussion turns to the impact of 
social grants on poverty, however, trends in access to social grants are discussed 
in more detail. 
 
Table 1: Composition of mean household income 
 
 Affected households Affected households 
that experienced 
morbidity or mortality 
in three or four periods 
Households that 
have not 
experienced 
morbidity or 
morality 
Source of 
income 
Rand 
(2000 
=100) 
Percentage Rand 
(2000 
=100) 
Percentage Rand 
(2000 
=100) 
Percentage 
Employment 
income 
735 49 502 41 1335 64 
Grant income 312 36 344 41 152 18 
Other non-
employment 
income 
73 6 55  
6 
109  
5 
Remittance 
income 
65 10 77 11 104 13 
Total 1185 100 978 100 1700 100 
Sample (n)  147  109  103 
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4. Access to Social Grants 
 
This section reports on the percentage of households that have benefited from 
certain grants. However, this discussion goes further insofar as it considers 
trends in eligibility for and access to social grants, as well as transitions in 
access to social grants, trends that are driven by changes in household 
composition resulting from a combination of migration and mortality, as well as 
by changes in the socio-economic circumstances of households. The discussion 
also goes one step further than many other papers on social grants, given that it 
considers the possible reasons why some poor, eligible households have not 
received the social grants to which they are entitled. 
 
Given the pro-poor bias in the sampling design, relatively large proportions of 
households received an income from any one or more of five types of social 
grants, namely the old-age pension and child support, disability, foster care and 
care dependency grants (Table 2). The proportion of households that received a 
social grant was significantly higher in the case of affected households and 
affected households that have experienced a high burden of morbidity or 
mortality when compared to households that have not experienced morbidity or 
mortality (P<0.01). In terms of the general trends in accessing social grants over 
the four waves, the evidence in Table 2 suggests that coverage in general has 
increased, both for affected households and for households that have not 
experienced morbidity or mortality, which mirrors the trends in provincial 
numbers of beneficiaries (section 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of households that received any social grant 
 
 Affected households Affected households 
that experienced 
morbidity or 
mortality in three or 
four periods 
Households that have 
not experienced 
morbidity or morality 
Wave I 45 48 28 
Wave II 47 51 28 
Wave III 51 56 35 
Wave IV 52 57 42 
Sample 170 126 108 
 
However, the picture looks quite different when one considers access to social 
grants, i.e. the percentage of those households that were eligible to receive a 
grant that actually received such grants, rather than simply coverage, i.e. the 
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number of households that benefited from a particular grant. This discussion is 
limited to the four social grants with the widest coverage (i.e. largest numbers of 
beneficiaries), namely the old-age pension and the child support, disability and 
foster care grants. The care dependency grant, as explained elsewhere, was 
excluded from this analysis due to the small number of households that had 
access to this grant (n<10). Eligibility was determined in relatively crude terms, 
given that the survey instrument was not designed to assess the eligibility of 
households to qualify for social assistance, but rather to collect information on 
the socio-economic circumstances of these households. Eligibility was defined 
as follows for each of the different social grants: 
 
• Old-age pension (OAP): Household included a male aged 65 years or older 
and/or a female aged 60 years or older. 
• Child support grant (CSG): Household included at least one child aged 7 
years or under. 
• Disability grant (DG): Household included a person that had been ill for 20 
or more days in the month preceding the interview and/or an ill person that 
was not able to perform daily tasks (e.g. work/play, recreation, household 
tasks, personal hygiene, mobility) by themselves. 
• Foster care grant (FCG): Household included at least one child aged fifteen 
years or under whose mother and father reportedly was not alive (a double 
orphan). 
• Means test: Households that did not currently receive any of these four 
grants, but qualified for such grants in terms of the above criteria were only 
considered eligible if average real adult equivalent per capita income was 
less than R250.2 Although this is not the means test as applied by the 
Department of Social Development in assessing grant eligibility, the use of 
this poverty line as a means test does provide some basis for excluding non-
poor households. Households that received a particular grant were 
automatically assumed to be eligible to receive such grant. This may of 
course not necessarily be true, given the fallibility of the grant application 
process.3 
                                                 
2 Households with the same level of income do not necessarily enjoy the same level of 
welfare. The larger the household, the lower the level of welfare at similar levels of household 
income. Measures of equivalent income are employed to allow for these differences in 
standard of living related to household characteristics (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995; Burkhauser 
et al., 1997). Household income was adjusted for differences in household size by dividing 
total monthly income by nα, where n represents the number of household members and α an 
adjustment for household economies of scale (Filmer & Pritchett, 1998). According to 
Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995), a α coefficient of 0.6 represents an adequately robust and 
reliable adjustment for household economies of scale. 
3 One cannot assess eligibility perfectly given one the lack of detailed information on grant 
recipients and other household members to apply grant criteria as formulated and two that the 
available information does not reflect the situation in the particular household when they 
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Access was then calculated around those households that actually received a 
grant, and was expressed as a percentage of those households that were eligible 
to receive a grant (based on the above criteria) or who actually received a grant. 
 
Figure 4 reports the percentage of households that were eligible to receive social 
grants. A higher proportion of affected households were eligible to receive old-
age pensions (P<0.1 for 3/4 waves) and child support grants (P<0.05 for 3/4 
waves), given that HIV/AIDS has seen households headed by or including 
elderly persons increasingly taking care of orphaned children or grandchildren 
or sick adults’ children as the epidemic takes its toll. The relative stability in the 
percentage of households that qualified for an old-age pension most likely 
reflects the relative low mobility of the elderly.4 The fluctuations over time in 
the percentage of households eligible to receive a child support and foster care 
grant reflect the relatively high mobility of young children and of orphaned 
children (Booysen et al., 2003). Given the high burden of morbidity in affected 
households (Booysen et al., 2003), a considerable proportion of affected 
households qualified for a disability grant (P<0.001). However, the percentage 
of affected households eligible to receive such a grant declined over time as the 
burden of morbidity on affected households declined (Bachmann & Booysen, 
2003). These fluctuations in eligibility for disability grants may partly reflect the 
mobility of ill persons, a number of whom have left their respective households 
over the study period, while it also reflects the fact that some grantees died prior 
to subsequent periods of the study.5  
 
The number of households eligible to receive a foster care grant increased over 
time as rates of orphanhood increased and as the orphan crisis took its toll 
(Booysen et al., 2003). As expected, more affected households qualified for a 
foster care grant compared to households that have not experienced morbidity or 
mortality (P<0.05 for 3/4 waves). For the most part, therefore, a significantly 
larger proportion of affected households qualified for social assistance compared 
to households that have not experienced morbidity or mortality. 
                                                                                                                                                        
actually applied for the grant, but rather current circumstances when the household was 
already a grant recipient. 
4 Family history studies in general assume the elderly to be immobile, despite little empirical, 
historical work having specifically investigated the phenomenon of migration of the elderly 
(Neven, 2003). 
5 These claims cannot be substantiated with the aid of this data, because the source of grant 
income is only recorded at the household and not at the individual level. Keller (2002) notes 
that this is a problem common to other household surveys employed by researchers in 
analysing the relationship between changes in household composition and access to social 
grants. 
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Figure 4: Eligibility for social grants (%) 
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Given that a larger proportion of affected households qualify for social 
assistance, the focus now falls on access to grants. In other words, did affected 
households actually benefit from the social assistance for which they qualified? 
Figure 4 reports the percentage of affected households that accessed social 
grants. The take-up of the old-age pension was very high, with more than 80 
percent of affected households having accessed an old-age pension. Access to 
the old-age pension remained relatively stable over the period, highlighting the 
high take-up rate of this grant (Case & Deaton, 1998; Samson et al., 2002). 
Access to the child support grant increased markedly over time, which mirrors 
the trends in the numbers of provincial grant beneficiaries reported in section 2. 
The decline in the number of affected households eligible to receive a disability 
grant translated into a marked increase in access. However, the absolute number 
of grantees remained relatively constant over time (15~16), thus belying the 
reported wholesale increase in the number of grant beneficiaries at the 
provincial level (section 2). There was no clear-cut trend in the percentage of 
affected households that accessed foster care grants. The absolute number of 
grantees, however, increased from 3 to 9 over the study period, thus supporting 
the evidence of a general increase in the number of grant beneficiaries at the 
provincial level (section 2). The fluctuations in take-up rates for the foster care 
grant most likely reflect the relatively high mobility of orphaned children 
(Young & Ansell, 2003; Booysen et al., 2003). 
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Table 3: Gains in access to social grants for affected households (%) 
 
 Transition probability Sample (n) 
  Old-age pension 25 12 
  Child support grant 13 204 
  Disability grant 14 125 
  Foster care grant 9 23 
Note: Access is defined in terms of the household being eligible to receive a grant (as 
described elsewhere) and having received an income from this specific source. 
 
Another way in which to analyse trends in access to social grants is to consider 
transition probabilities. Table 3 reports for each grant the proportion of poor, 
affected households eligible for a grant that gained access to that grant during a 
subsequent period. A high transition probability means that coverage increases 
at a rapid rate (i.e. a large proportion of eligible households receive their grants 
in the subsequent period), whereas a low probability suggests that coverage 
expands slowly. The probability of transition is of course the result of many 
factors, including the extent to which people are familiar with the grant and the 
complexity and duration of the application process. The results support the 
arguments about trends in access to social grants reported in Figure 5, with 
coverage in child support, disability and foster care grants expanding at a 
relatively low rate compared to the old-age pension. 
 
Given that eligibility for these grants is driven by the burden of chronic illness 
and the orphan crisis associated with the epidemic, the evidence on eligibility 
and access presented here emphasises the likely importance of the old-age 
pension and child support, disability and foster care grants in mitigating the 
impact of HIV/AIDS because of the impact of the epidemic on household 
composition, and the role of HIV/AIDS in driving households into or deeper 
into poverty. Apart from the old-age pension, however, there seem to exist wide 
disparities between access and eligibility, as is evident from Figure 5. Samson 
(2002), Samson et al. (2002), and Guthrie (2002) emphasise the role of 
problems with targeting and administration in explaining the low take-up rates 
for grants such as the child support, foster care and disability grants. As such, 
much scope remains to improve take-up rates for these social grants. 
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Figure 5: Access to social grants for affected households (%) 
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Hence, although the social welfare system in some sense is often seen as the 
panacea to various socio-economic impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, many 
poor, affected households remain beyond the grasp of the safety-net provided by 
social grants. In the following two tables, the characteristics of those poor, 
affected households that were eligible for social grants but did not receive a 
grant are explored in more detail so as to enhance understanding of the nature of 
this exclusion. This can be defined as social exclusion or a lack of participation 
in social institutions (D'Ambrosio & Chakravarty, 2003). According to Stewart 
(2003) this ‘concept was developed in industrialised countries to describe the 
processes of marginalisation and deprivation which can arise even within rich 
countries with comprehensive welfare provisions’. As such, the concept is 
particularly relevant for this discussion. This is important, given that the 
literature on social grants does not attempt to answer this important question, but 
simply notes the fact that a high proportion of the poor remain outside the grasp 
of the social safety net. A comparison is drawn between poor, affected 
households that have complete access to social grants (i.e. households that 
received all those grants for which they were eligible) versus poor, affected 
households that have never accessed grants (i.e. households that received none 
of the social grants for which they were eligible). 
 
Table 4 reports on the extent of the social and economic exclusion of poor, 
affected households. On the one hand, households with no access to social 
grants were significantly more likely to never have accessed social support 
compared to households with complete access to social grants, thus supporting 
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the social exclusion hypothesis. On the other hand, households with complete 
access to social grants were significantly more likely to never have received 
assistance or remittance income from family or friends compared to households 
with no access to social grants. This may reflect the extent to which public 
transfers crowd out private transfers and assistance from the extended family. 
Jensen (2002), for example, explored the extent to which old-age pensions 
crowd out private transfers. He found that each Rand of public pension crowds 
out 25 to 30 cents of private transfers from children outside of the household, 
thus suggesting that the distributional effects of the old-age pension may be 
overstated. Maitra (1999) in turn found evidence of crowding out of private 
transfers for old-age pensions as well as for other government transfers. This in 
fact implies that households without access to social grants are more reliant on 
help from family or friends and in actual fact is less excluded socially than 
households with access to social grants (obviously, this may be because those 
households that received grants do not have to ask family and friends for 
assistance insofar as they benefit from social grants, unlike those households 
with no access to grants). None of the parameters of economic exclusion 
differed significantly statistically between households excluded from social 
grants and households with complete access to grants. 
 
A more significant distinction between excluded and non-excluded households 
appears to be a lack of access to public services (Table 4). Although all the 
households had access to sanitation, a significantly larger percentage of 
excluded households did not have access to electricity or to water supply in their 
dwelling. Excluded households were also significantly more likely to have no 
access to a public refuse removal service. Households without access to grants 
were also significantly more likely to have no access to a telephone compared to 
households with complete access to social grants. The above evidence suggests 
that it may be those people without access to public services that are also not 
aware of the existence of social grants and/or the procedures to be followed to 
apply for such grants. Social and economic exclusion in turn do not appear to be 
that important in explaining lack of access to social grants, although these crude 
measures of social and economic exclusion may not be ideal. The role of lack of 
public service in explaining lack of access to grants makes sense insofar as 
information about grants is often disseminated by the same local government 
structures that provide these services. As such, there may be a need to use public 
communications media such as radio and television to more widely spread 
information about social grants. 
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Table 4: Social and economic exclusion of poor, eligible affected 
households (%) 
 
Indicator Poor, eligible 
affected 
households 
with complete 
access to 
grants 
Poor, eligible 
affected 
households 
with no 
access to 
grants 
P 
Access to social support networks:    
No access to a social support 
network 
32 63 0.008 
Never asked and received help 
from family or friends 
52 18 0.002 
Never received remittance income 88 47 <0.001 
Access to economic support 
networks: 
   
Never included an employed 
person 
16 8 0.232 
Never included a person in formal 
employment 
20 27 0.333 
Never owned dwelling 0 2 0.713 
Access to public services:    
No access to electricity 0 24 0.004 
No access to water in dwelling 0 27 0.001 
No access to waterborne sanitation 100 100 - 
No access to refuse removal by 
local authority 
4 21 0.044 
No access to telephone 12 45 0.003 
Sample (n) 25 62  
Note: ‘Never’ = not in any period. Access to social support networks refers to whether any 
member of the household had benefited from a savings club/stokvel (although the benefits are 
monetary, these are social institutions), a women's group, church-based support, NAPWA, 
Hospice, ATTIC, a support group, or from family or friends. 
 
Table 5 reports on the demographic characteristics and household composition 
of these ‘socially excluded’ households. Currently, social grants target mainly 
those poor families that include children and elderly persons. This is evident 
from the results presented in Table 5. Households excluded from social grants 
had a significantly lower dependency ratio and included a significantly smaller 
percentage of children aged under seven and of elderly people compared to 
households with complete access to social grants. There was no statistically 
significant difference between excluded and non-excluded households in terms 
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of the total years of schooling of the members of the household. Excluded 
households were also likely to be significantly smaller than households with 
complete access to social grants, and were significantly more likely to be headed 
by females. Persons heading excluded households were significantly younger 
than persons heading non-excluded households. In addition, excluded 
households were significantly more likely to include a smaller proportion of 
persons from the extended family (other relations of the head of the household) 
and a higher proportion of persons belonging to the nuclear family (sons and 
daughters of the head of the household). Hence, in terms of household 
composition and characteristics, certain poor, affected households remain 
outside of the grasp of the social safety-net provided by social grants. 
 
 
Table 5: Demographic characteristics and composition of poor, eligible 
affected households with no access to social grants (%) 
 
Indicator Poor, eligible 
households that 
received a 
government 
grant 
Poor, eligible 
households that 
did not receive 
a government 
grant 
P 
Dependency ratio 38 30 0.093 
Household size 5 4 0.091 
Total years of schooling 30 29 0.724 
Female household head 12 44 0.004 
Average age of household head 
(years) 
49 41 0.048 
Household composition:    
Percentage children aged 0-6 
years 
23 14 0.013 
Percentage children aged 7-14 
years 
12 16 0.299 
Percentage adults 62 70 0.117 
Percentage elderly 2 0 0.005 
Total 100 100  
Percentage persons belonging to 
nuclear family 
72 81 0.081 
Percentage persons belonging to 
extended family 
28 18 0.065 
Percentage persons not related to 
household head 
0 1 0.353 
Total 100 100  
Sample (n) 25 62  
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5. The Role of Social Grants in Poverty 
Alleviation 
 
There is a body of evidence that has highlighted the role of social assistance in 
reducing the incidence and depth of poverty in South Africa (Lund, 1999; 
Samson, 2002; Samson et al., 2002; Seekings, 2002; Woolard, 2003). Much of 
the earlier work on the impact of social grants (or social assistance or targeted 
transfers) on poverty focused on the success of the old-age pension (Case and 
Deaton, 1998; Jensen, 2002) and the importance of this source of income for 
household security and household food security (Lund, 1999). Ravallion (2003) 
emphasises the important role of targeted transfers in alleviating poverty, based 
on growing evidence of some successes that contradict the often held belief that 
the benefits of targeted transfers are captured by others or that coverage of such 
transfers is too low to make any real difference. Devereux (2002: 657) in turn 
argues that social safety-nets can help mitigate chronic poverty insofar as part of 
welfare transfers is invested in ‘income-generating activities, education, social 
network, and the acquisition of productive assets’. Yet, research on social grants 
also shows that a large proportion of the South African population (as much as 
half of the population according to one report) would remain in poverty even if 
take-up rates of current grants were 100 percent (Samson, 2002; Samson et al., 
2002; Seekings, 2002; Woolard, 2003). 
 
HIV/AIDS-affected households are at a disadvantage compared to households 
that have not experienced morbidity or mortality, both socially and 
economically. Affected households, and in particular affected households that 
have experienced a high burden of morbidity or mortality, were relatively worse 
off than households that have not experienced morbidity or mortality. This was 
the case regardless of whether income, expenditure or food expenditure was 
employed as a measure of household welfare. The incidence, depth and severity 
of poverty was worse amongst affected households compared to households that 
have not experienced morbidity or mortality, especially in the case of affected 
households that had experienced morbidity or mortality in each wave. This was 
the case regardless of the choice of poverty line or poverty measure. Affected 
households were also more likely than households that have not experienced 
morbidity or mortality to have slipped into poverty, while a relatively larger 
proportion of affected households, and in particular affected households that 
faced a greater burden of illness or death, were classified as chronically poor 
(Booysen et al., 2003). Social grants, therefore, are likely to play a particularly 
important role in keeping affected households from slipping deeper into poverty, 
while in some cases ensuring that household do not slip into poverty. 
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Figure 6: Absolute income mobility by changes in access to social 
grants: A conceptual framework 
 
 Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV 
Got ahead Average real income increased by 10% or more from 
baseline 
No change in income Average real income changed by less than 10% from 
baseline 
Fell behind Average real income declined by 10% or more from 
baseline 
| ² ² ² 
| | ² ² 
Access to social grant 
discontinued 
| | | ² 
² | | | 
² ² | | 
Gained access to social grant 
² ² ² | 
 
In order to explore the relative importance of specific events associated with 
changes in household welfare, we follow an approach similar to that employed 
by Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001).6 Figure 6 presents these events in schematic 
fashion. For the sake of simplicity, the focus here is only on those cases where 
access to a social grant was discontinued in any subsequent period and where 
the household did not receive a grant for the remainder of the period. Likewise, 
the emphasis is only on those cases where a household that did not receive a 
social grant at baseline gained access to a grant in any subsequent period, and 
where the household received such grant in each of the remaining periods. 
(There obviously exists more permutations, but the link between these 
transitions in access to grants and changes in income can only be analysed with 
more advanced statistical techniques). Households were considered to have 
                                                 
6 Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001) also determined the nature of the main income events 
associated with changes in poverty status. An analysis of this nature applied to the data 
exhibited no statistically significant differences between affected households and households 
that have experienced no morbidity or mortality in terms of changes in specific types of 
income. This most probably is the result of the relatively small number of households that 
have not experienced morbidity or mortality that moved into (n=25) and out of (n=26) 
poverty, with less than 20 households experiencing any one type of main income event 
between any two consecutive waves of the panel. It is hoped that data from the complete 
panel will enable the author to perform such analysis with a larger number of observations. 
  22
'gotten ahead' ('fallen behind') if the average adult equivalent household income 
calculated across waves II to IV had increased (decreased) by at least 10 percent 
since baseline, an approach that according to Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001: 
683) reduces errors resulting from errors in the measurement of income. No 
distinction is made between affected households and households that have not 
experienced morbidity or mortality, given that the numbers of households that 
gained access to social grants (n=38) or that lost access to social grants (n=18) 
were too small too allow a meaningful analysis at the disaggregrate level. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
 
Table 6: Absolute change in adult equivalent income between waves I 
and IV for households that GAINED access to social grants (%) 
 
 Old-age 
pension 
[R700/ 
month] 
Child 
support 
grant 
[R160/ 
month] 
Disability 
grant 
[R700/ 
month] 
Foster  
care grant 
[R500/ 
month] 
Any social 
grant 
Got ahead 72 41 65 43 55 
No change 27 19 17 28 5 
Fell behind 0 39 17 28 40 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sample (n) 11 41 23 7 38 
 
As expected, households that had gained access to social grants, especially the 
relatively larger grants, were more likely to have gotten ahead (Table 6). In 
general, more than half of households that gained access to social grants got 
ahead. Almost three quarters of those households that gained access to an old-
age pension got ahead, while almost three quarters of households that gained 
access to the disability grant got ahead. Just more than 40 percent of households 
that gained access to the foster care and child support grants got ahead. Not 
surprisingly, the child support grant, the smallest of these grants, did not 
consistently aid households in escaping poverty. Almost 40 percent of 
households that gained access to a child support grant over the study period still 
ended up falling behind. However, even in the case of the foster care grant, 28 
percent of households that gained access to the child support grant over the 
study period actually fell behind, compared to 17 percent of those that gained 
access to the disability grant and none of those that gained access to the other 
social grants. This highlights the complexity of poverty transitions and the need 
to employ panel regression techniques to identify the most important 
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determinants of changes in poverty status, including changes in household 
composition, which are closely linked to access to social grants. 
 
In terms of social grants in general, more than half of households that lost access 
to a social grant fell behind (Table 7), thus highlighting the relative importance 
of grant income in explaining changes in household welfare. The results were 
not that clear-cut in terms of the association between changes in poverty status 
and a discontinuation in access to specific social grants. Only in the case of the 
foster care grant and old-age pension did a relatively large proportion of 
households that lost access to such grant fall behind. Yet, a discontinuation in 
access to grants at least ensured that households maintained their absolute 
standard of living, with less than 20 percent of households that lost access to an 
old pension or a child support or disability grant falling behind. Yet, more than 
half of households that in subsequent periods lost access to a foster care grant 
had actually gotten ahead. Although these results need to be interpreted with 
caution due to the small sample size (n<5), this may hint at the success of 
targeting social grants at the poor, i.e. households that got ahead not qualifying 
for a grant anymore (the same argument applies to the findings that show that a 
relatively large proportion of households that gained access to a grant have 
fallen behind in certain cases). As argued elsewhere, this highlights the 
complexity of poverty transitions and the need to employ panel regression 
techniques to identify the most important determinants of changes in poverty 
status, including changes in household composition, which are closely linked to 
access to social grants. 
 
 
Table 7: Absolute change in adult equivalent income between waves I 
and IV for households that LOST access to social grants (%) 
 
 Old-age 
pension 
[R700/ 
month] 
Child 
support 
grant 
[R160/ 
month] 
Disability 
grant 
[R700/ 
month] 
Foster care 
grant 
[R500/ 
month] 
Any social 
grant 
Got ahead 19 18 10 50 17 
No change 31 55 60 0 22 
Fell behind 50 27 30 50 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sample (n) 16 11 10 2 18 
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Another, perhaps more common way of exploring the poverty impacts of social 
grants is to calculate the standard poverty measures for income inclusive and 
exclusive of grants (Samson et al., 2002; Bhorat, 2003; Woolard, 2003). This 
allows one to assess the impact of social grants on the incidence, depth and 
severity of poverty.7 These results are reported in Table 8, with a distinction 
being made between affected households, affected households that have 
experienced a high burden of morbidity and mortality, and households that have 
not experienced morbidity or mortality. These poverty measures were simply 
calculated based on total household income exclusive of grants. No adjustments 
were made for a so-called 'tax credit', given that households in the absence of 
social grants will pay less taxes insofar as government will not have to raise 
taxes to pay for public expenditure on social grants. Therefore, the results 
presented in Table 8 present a crude estimate only of the impact of social grants 
on the incidence, depth and severity of poverty. In addition, it would be 
worthwhile to perform this analysis by type of grant to assess the impact of 
different types of grants on poverty. For example, one would expect the 
disability and foster care grants to contribute significantly towards poverty 
alleviation in affected households. For the sake of simplicity, and due to 
constraints of space, however, this paper focuses only on the impact on poverty 
of social grants in general. 
 
Social grants play an important role in alleviating poverty, not only in affected 
households, but also in households that have not experienced morbidity or 
mortality (Table 8). In percentage terms, the incidence, depth and severity of 
poverty dropped considerably over the period. The reduction in the incidence, 
depth and severity of poverty since baseline (i.e. the percentage change in the 
poverty measure calculated at baseline exclusive of social grants and the poverty 
measure calculated at wave IV inclusive of social grants) was more pronounced 
in affected households compared to households that have not experienced 
morbidity or mortality. The incidence of poverty declined by 36 and 30 percent 
since baseline in affected households and households that have not experienced 
morbidity or mortality respectively. The depth of poverty declined by 71 percent 
since baseline in affected households, compared to 55 percent for households 
that have not experienced morbidity of mortality. The severity of poverty 
declined by 83 and 67 percent since baseline in affected households and 
                                                 
7 The headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap indices are special cases of the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty measures. Pα= 1/nΣ[z-yi /z]α, where z represents the 
poverty line and yi the actual income or consumption level of each person or household. The 
three FGT measures each focus on a different conventional poverty measure. P0, P1 and P2 
respectively are derivatives of the headcount (H), poverty gap (PG) and squared poverty gap 
(SPG) indices (Greer & Thorbecke, 1986). These poverty measures become more sensitive to 
the well-being of the poorest person as the value of α increases (Woolard & Leibbrandt, 1999: 
28). 
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households that have not experienced morbidity or mortality respectively. 
Importantly, though, the rate of poverty reduction continued to increase over 
time in affected households, but remained relative stable in the case of 
households that have not experienced morbidity or mortality. This saw the gap 
in the incidence, depth and severity of poverty between affected households and 
households that have not experienced morbidity decline. 
 
 
Table 8: Poverty measures inclusive and exclusive of government grants 
(%) 
 
 Affected households (n=147) Households that have not 
experienced morbidity or mortality 
(n=103) 
 Income 
excluding 
govern-
ment 
grants 
Income 
including  
govern-
ment 
grants 
Reduction 
in poverty 
measure 
(%) 
Income 
excluding 
govern-
ment 
grants 
Income 
including 
govern-
ment 
grants 
Reduction 
in poverty 
measure 
(%) 
Incidence of 
poverty 
(P0): 
      
Wave I 58.5 42.2 28 38.8 26.2 33 
Wave II 55.1 35.4 36 38.8 25.2 35 
Wave III 57.1 37.4 35 39.8 23.3 42 
Wave IV 63.3 37.4 41 43.7 27.2 38 
       
Depth of 
 poverty 
(P1): 
      
Wave I 40.1 17.1 57 23.7 11.0 54 
Wave II 42.4 15.2 64 23.1 11.3 51 
Wave III 40.5 14.7 64 26.1 10.6 59 
Wave IV 42.4 11.7 72 28.0 10.6 62 
       
Severity of 
poverty 
(P2): 
      
Wave I 33.0 10.0 70 18.3 6.2 66 
Wave II 36.0 9.7 73 17.7 6.6 63 
Wave III 35.3 8.5 76 20.8 7.1 66 
Wave IV 35.4 5.6 84 22.8 6.0 74 
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The depth and severity of poverty in affected households by wave IV were more 
or less on a par with households that have not experienced morbidity or 
mortality. The incidence of poverty was still somewhat higher in affected 
households compared to households that have not experienced morbidity or 
mortality. Most importantly, the reductions in the severity of poverty since 
baseline were statistically significant in the case of affected households 
(P<0.05). Hence, social grants have resulted in a significant reduction in the 
severity of poverty in affected households. This suggests that social grants play 
an important role in alleviating poverty (bringing people closer to the poverty 
line), more so than eradicating poverty (lifting people out of poverty).8 
 
 
6. Regression Results 
 
This section of the paper explores a number of other aspects related to social 
grants, and draws primarily on the literature on social grants with a distinct 
South African focus. Regressions were run for affected households only. All the 
regression results reported in these pages are for pooled OLS or probit 
estimations (More extensive literature on social transfers also employs 
instrumental variable techniques. Further work in this regard will also attempt to 
apply these techniques, as well standard panel regression techniques). Sections 
6.1 and 6.2 focus on the determinants of grant income and take-up rates of 
grants respectively, while section 6.3 explores the impact of social grants on 
household expenditure on food and expenditure. Finally, section 6.4 investigates 
the impact of social grants on decisions regarding labour market participation. 
 
 
6.1 Determinants of Grant Income 
 
In order to determine who benefits from social grants, it is necessary to assess 
the determinants of grant income. Table 9 reports the pooled OLS estimates of 
the effects of the amount of household grant receipts, of household income 
exclusive of social grants, demographic composition, and place of residence. In 
addition,  include is a number of variables indicative of eligibility for specific 
social grants, notably the number of persons of pension age (OAP), the number 
of children aged seven years or under (CSG), the number of chronically ill 
persons (DG), and the number of orphaned children (FCG). A similar approach 
                                                 
8 The trends over time in the incidence, depth and severity of poverty in affected households 
that experienced a high burden of morbidity and mortality; not reported here due to 
constraints of space, were similar to the trends for affected households in general, although 
these reductions were achieved off a higher base. 
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was followed by Case and Deaton (1998) in exploring the role of old-age 
pensions in South Africa. 
 
 
Table 9: Determinants of grant income in affected households (%) 
 
Independent variables OAP CSG DG FCG 
Income excluding grant 0.029** 0.066** 0.160** 0.129** 
Household size -1.801 -0.095 14.578** -14.734** 
Number of children aged 
0-5 years 
-10.422 11.138** -1.822 49.831** 
Number of children aged 
6-15 years 
-1.987 2.779 -2.248 31.097** 
Number of members aged 
16-24 years 
14.274** 2.769 -0.561 11.348* 
Rural place of residence 4.511 13.382** 28.210** -37.768** 
Number of male 
pensioners 
392.728**    
Number of female 
pensioners 
473.363**    
Number of male children 
7 years or under 
 -4.275   
Number of female 
children 7 years or under 
 11.066**   
Number of chronically ill 
persons 
  11.332  
Number of orphaned 
children 
   -5.903 
Constant 7.564 -23.866** -57.948** 72.836** 
Number of observations 
(n) 
768 768 768 753 
F statistic (P) 355.6 
(P<0.001) 
64.8 
(P<0.001) 
40.2 
(P<0.001) 
45.0 
(P<0.001) 
R2 0.789 0.405 0.270 0.792 
Adjusted R2 0.787 0.399 0.263 0.794 
Note: Results are for pooled OLS regressions. Dependent variables are monthly household 
grant incomes by type of social grant. All values are expressed in nominal terms. Coefficients 
with two asterisks are statistically significant at the 95% level and coefficients with one 
asterisk are statistically significant at the 90% level. 
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As expected, the main determinants of income from old-age pensions and child 
support grants are the number of age-eligible persons in the household (Table 9). 
Interestingly, however, the number of male children aged seven years or under 
did not successfully predict income from child support grants, which suggests 
that these households are more likely to apply for this grant for female children 
(More research is required to determine why male children in affected 
households may not be benefiting from this social grant). The fact that the 
number of chronically ill persons and orphaned children did not feature as 
significant determinants of income from disability and foster care grants 
respectively most likely is the result of the low take-up of these grants (section 
4). Contrary to expectations, grant income increased as income exclusive of 
social grants increased. Case and Deaton (1998) found grant income to increase 
as income exclusive of grants fell, which is what one would expect insofar as 
grants target poorer households. (More work is required to verify this result, 
given that instrumental variable approaches may be necessary to adjust for the 
possible measure error in income estimates and reported pension income). Given 
that poverty is more pronounced in rural areas, households resident in rural areas 
received more income from child support and disability grants compared to 
urban households. The one exception, though, was foster care grants, where 
urban households received more income in the form of foster care grants 
compared to rural households. This most likely reflects the fact that application 
costs may be higher in rural than in urban places of residence. Application for a 
foster care grant requires a person to be assigned as legal guardian of the 
orphaned child by the court, which is often a lengthy process. Rural areas are 
more remote and offices of the Department of Home Affairs and courts are less 
accessible due to distance, associated transport and other costs. This raises 
particular questions as to how access to foster care grants can be improved in 
remote, rural areas. None of the other independent variables featured 
consistently as significant determinants of grant income across different types of 
social grants. 
 
 
6.2 Determinant of Take-up of Social Grants 
 
Riphahn (2001) presents a good overview of international literature on the 
economic modelling of take-up rates. The subsequent discussion employs 
regression analysis in exploring the determinants of take-up rates for individual 
social grants, given that uptake of social grants amongst affected households has 
been shown to be relatively low in the case of the child support, disability and 
foster care grants (section 4). We follow an approach similar to that of Riphahn 
(2001), who estimated the effects of the benefit amount and of variables that 
approximate benefit duration, application costs and stigma on grant take-up or 
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so-called ‘hidden poverty’ (people who are eligible for social assistance ‘hide’ 
their poverty by opting not to take up such transfers). The benefit effect is 
measured by the poverty degree, i.e. the poverty gap expressed as a percentage 
of the poverty line of R250 real adult equivalent income. Benefit duration is 
approximated by whether the head of the household is a pensioner, the years of 
education of the household head, and whether the household own their home.  
 
The argument here is that the need for public support will be relatively 
permanent for households headed by pensioners (if existing retirement benefits 
are insufficient), for households headed by persons with little education 
(reflecting a low earnings potential), or for households that do not own their 
homes (also reflecting a low earnings potential). Riphahn (2001) also 
distinguished between single parent status and single parent with young children 
status as benefit duration indicators, indicators that were excluded from the 
analysis presented in these pages. Application cost and stigma effects are 
approximated by whether the household is headed by a female, the age of the 
household head, place of residence, and the number of children aged seven years 
or under. The argument here is that social norms may imply that not being able 
to provide for one's family and being reliant on social assistance is a more 
stigmatising event for men than for women. Similarly, being reliant on social 
assistance may be a more stigmatising event for younger heads of household 
than for older persons. Application costs may be higher in rural than in urban 
places of residence, given that rural areas are more remote and offices of the 
Department of Home Affairs and Social Development, which are situated 
mainly in urban areas, are less accessible due to distance, associated transport 
and other costs. Finally, the presence of young children may motivate the head 
of household to ensure that a means of subsistence is accessible via social 
assistance. 
 
Based on the above, one may argue that the take-up of disability and foster care 
grants may remain low due to the associated stigma and the relatively high 
application cost of these grants. Access to a disability grant may label a 
household as HIV/AIDS-affected. (Others, however, based mainly on anecdotal 
evidence, have argued that access to the disability grant presents a perverse 
incentive for opting to forego medical treatment where access to the grant in fact 
means that the persons will be in a better situation than without the grant, but not 
receiving treatment). As mentioned, application for a foster care grant requires a 
person to be assigned as legal guardian of the orphaned child by the court, which 
is often a lengthy process. The take-up of child support grants in turn may 
remain low due to their relatively small value (or benefit effect) compared to 
other social grants, as highlighted in the low, although increasing, uptake of 
these grants in this sample of households, as well as in South Africa as a whole 
(Samson et al., 2002). 
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Table 10: Determinants of hidden poverty in affected households 
 
Independent variables OAP CSG DG FCG 
Benefit effect:     
Poverty degree -0.025** 0.004 -0.011** -0.022 
Duration effect:     
Household headed by 
pensioner 
-0.483 -0.121 -0.677** 0.567 
Education of household 
head (years) 
-0.158** -0.044** -0.030 0.044 
Owns dwelling -0.582 -0.222 0.109 -1.014* 
Application cost and 
stigma effect: 
    
Female household head 0.365 0.226 -0.119 -0.027 
Age of household head 0.014 -0.009 0.016* -0.007 
Rural place of residence 0.362 0.652** -0.031  
Number of children aged 7 
years or under 
-0.156  0.243 -0.703 
Constant 1.724 -0.796 -1.365* 1.066 
Number of observations 
(n) 
204 410 325 51 
LR Chi2 statistic (P) 38.0 
(P<0.00
1) 
43.4 
(P<0.00
1) 
21.5 
(0.005) 
10.7 
(0.150) 
Pseudo R2 0.281 0.090 0.067 0.157 
Notes: Results are for pooled probit regressions. A dependent variable is ‘hidden poverty’, 
where a value of 1 represents a household that was eligible for a specific grant but did not 
have access to the grant, whereas a value of zero represents a household that had access to the 
specific grant at the time. The ‘poverty degree’ was calculated as the poverty gap as 
percentage of the poverty line. The results of the regression analysis that included the poverty 
gap rather than the poverty degree as independent variable yielded similar results. The 
number of children aged < 7 years were dropped from the CSG regressions due to 
multicollinearity. In the FCG regression, no eligible households that took up the grant at the 
time of the interview resided in rural areas. Subsequently, place of residence was dropped 
from the regression. Coefficients with two asterisks are statistically significant at the 95% 
level and coefficients with one asterisk are statistically significant at the 90% level. 
 
The probability of non-uptake declined for the old-age pension and the disability 
grant as entitlement to benefit increased, i.e. as the degree of poverty increased, 
exemplifying the so-called benefit effect. There is also evidence of duration 
effects. The probability of non-uptake of old-age pensions and child support 
grants declined as the number of years of education of the household increased, 
which supports the argument that uptake increases as earnings potential 
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increases. Only in the case of the disability grant, however, did the probability of 
non-uptake increase if the household head was a pensioner. Ownership of 
dwelling was negatively associated with non-uptake of the foster care grant. 
However, one would have expected non-uptake to increase if households did not 
own their residence, the latter being a proxy of a lower earnings potential. 
Finally, there is little evidence of application cost and stigma effects. The only 
result that confirms the stated hypothesis is the strong positive association 
between place of residence and non-uptake of child support grants. Non-uptake 
of child support grants was much more likely in rural areas compared to urban 
areas. As argued above, application costs may be higher in rural than in urban 
places of residence, given that rural areas are more remote. In the case of the 
other variables approximating stigma effects, the results, where they were 
statistically significant, did not confirm with the stated hypotheses. The 
probability of non-uptake of disability grants increased with age (the effect was 
not that pronounced, though, and the coefficient is relatively small), whereas it 
was expected that younger household heads are more likely to not take up social 
assistance insofar as it is expected of them to be able to provide for their 
families. None of the other independent variables featured as statistically 
significant determinants of non-uptake of social grants in affected households. 
 
 
6.3 Impact of Social Grants on Household 
Expenditure on Food and Education 
 
Booysen et al. (2003) have shown that affected households are more likely to 
spend less on food and education compared to households that have not 
experienced morbidity or mortality, probably due to expenditure on health care 
and funeral crowding out these expenditures. In addition, there is strong 
evidence that HIV/AIDS may cause children to be taken from school so as to 
help the household cope with the burden of illness and/or death, often due to the 
inability of the household to afford to pay school fees (Booysen et al., 2003). An 
important question, therefore, is whether additional income from social grants 
shows up in increases in expenditure on food or education. To this end, we 
follow the approach of Case and Deaton (1998) by regressing household 
expenditure on food and education on income exclusive of social grants and 
income from each of the individual social grants, controlling for a number of 
characteristics of the household and head of household (Table 11). If the 
coefficients on grant income are larger than the coefficient on income excluding 
grants, recipients prefer to employ these additional resources to pay for food or 
education. If in turn the coefficients are smaller, grant income is being spent in 
some other way. If income from social grants is spent on food and on education, 
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it would mean that social grants do play an important role in mitigating some of 
the socio-economic impacts of HIV/AIDS. 
 
According to the results presented in Table 11, increases in income exclusive of 
social grants saw household expenditure on food increase. However, income 
received from a number of social grants saw household expenditure on food 
increase at a greater rate compared to income exclusive of social grants, which 
means that recipients prefer to employ these additional resources to pay for 
food. Increases in income received from disability and foster care grants saw 
household expenditure on food increase. In addition, income received by 
affected households in the form of old-age pensions and care dependency grants 
saw expenditure on food increase. Receipts from foster care grants resulted in 
the greatest increase in household expenditure on food. As expected, households 
headed by persons with higher levels of education spent more on food (higher 
levels of education translates into higher levels of income and higher levels of 
expenditure), as did larger households. Households headed by older persons and 
by females spent less on food compared to households headed by males, while 
rural households spent less on food than urban households (levels of income are 
relatively lower in rural than in urban areas). 
 
Households do not appear to employ income receipts in the form of social grants 
to pay for education. As in the case of food expenditure, increases in income 
exclusive of social grants saw household expenditure on education increase. 
However, only in one case did increased grant receipts result in increases in 
household expenditure on education larger than the increases in expenditure on 
education resulting from increases in income exclusive of grants. Income 
received by affected households in the form of old-age pensions saw household 
expenditure on education increase. This is an important result, given that many 
orphaned and other children live in households headed by their grandparents 
(Booysen et al., 2003). Transfers targeted at the elderly may therefore benefit 
these children indirectly. 
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Table 11: Social grants and household expenditure on food and 
education 
 
Independent variables Average monthly food 
expenditure 
Average monthly 
education expenditure 
Old-age pension 0.229** 0.105* 
Child support grant 0.012 -0.632* 
Disability grant 0.139** 0.021 
Care dependency grant 0.277** -0.043 
Foster care grant 0.350** -0.024 
Income excluding grants 0.108** 0.030** 
Household size 8.647** -6.741 
Children aged 0-5 years -16.131** 15.035 
Children aged 6-15 years 15.538** 33.042* 
Children aged 16-18 
years 
6.030 44.607** 
Children aged 19-21 
years 
11.881 -12.998 
Children aged 22-24 
years 
-20.543** 73.099** 
Age of household head -11.351** -38.194** 
Squared age of 
household head 
132.404** 510.667** 
Education of household 
head (years) 
5.408** 8.576** 
Female household head -21.961** 9.584 
Rural place of residence -41.145** -64.836** 
Constant -226.256 -1629.401** 
Number of observations 
(n) 
2334 140 
F statistic (P) 177.9 
(P<0.001) 
3.45 
(P<0.001) 
R2 0.566 0.324 
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.230 
Note: Results are for pooled OLS regressions. Dependent variables are monthly household 
expenditure on food and expenditure expressed in nominal terms. Coefficients with two 
asterisks are statistically significant at the 95% level and coefficients with one asterisk are 
statistically significant at the 90% level. 
 
Duflo (2000) likewise found transfers in the form of old-age pensions to benefit 
children in terms of nutritional status only where the recipient was male, 
particularly in the case of female children. (Contrary to expectations, increased 
receipts in the form of child support grants actually saw household expenditure 
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on education decline, which may be the result of these grants primarily targeting 
pre-school children aged seven years or under). Thus, many transfers targeted at 
children (i.e. child support, care dependency and foster care grants) do not 
necessarily benefit these child beneficiaries in terms of paying for their 
schooling, given that it is in most cases the caregiver rather than the child that 
has control over these resources and that these resources are often employed to 
the benefit of the entire household rather than the intended beneficiaries. This 
raises the question as to whether such grants should rather be administered via 
the education system in order to ensure that these transfers benefit children in a 
more direct way, e.g. by paying for school fees or funding a nutrition 
programme at schools. 
 
 
6.4 Impact of Social Grants on Decisions on Labour 
Force Participation 
 
Access to social grants stands to influence a number of individual decisions 
made by those household members that are likely to benefit directly or indirectly 
from such grants, including decisions about saving, labour market participation, 
retirement, education, migration and fertility (Marchand & Pestieau, 1991). 
According to Bertrand et al. ‘targeted public transfers to specific demographic 
groups within extended households could have important behavioural effects on 
some non-targeted groups if redistribution is large’ (2000: 2). Their argument is 
that younger relatives living with older persons in three-generation households 
may lower their labour supply as result of large cash transfers to the household 
in the form of social grants, assuming of course that households pool these 
resources and that household members other than the recipient actually benefit 
from the transfer. Case (2001) reports that this is indeed the case when is comes 
to old-age pensions in South Africa. Jensen (2002), however, reports no 
evidence of any significant effect of old-age pension transfers on migration, 
labour supply and household composition. To investigate the impact of social 
grants on decisions regarding labour market participation, we regressed four 
labour market outcomes onto grant receipts, individual demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age and education, as well as various household 
characteristics, which include household size, household composition and place 
of residence. The sample population is individuals aged 15 to 50 years that 
reside in so-called three-generation households, i.e. households that include a 
household head, children and grandchildren or a household head, children and 
parents. The four labour market outcomes (or dummies) were the following: 
• Employment status: Person during the past 7 days did work for pay, profit or 
family gain, either on a full-time, part-time or casual basis, or actually had a 
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full-time, part-time or casual job during the past 7 days but was absent from 
work due to illness. 
• Unemployed status: Person was not working, but looking for work. 
• Labour force participation status: Person was employed or was not working, 
but looking for work. 
• Discouraged worker status: Person was not working, not looking for work, 
but available for work. 
 
The emphasis in this discussion is primarily on the impact of receipts from 
social grants on labour force participation and the discouraged worker effect, 
rather than the results for the employment and unemployment outcomes, given 
that on an a priori basis one may argue that increases in social assistance will 
discourage people to participate in the labour force or to actively seek work. 
Increased receipts by affected households in the form of disability grants saw the 
likelihood of labour force participation decline. There are a number of likely 
explanations for this effect. On the one hand, it may be the illness experienced 
by adults that causes the same persons to be less likely to participate in the 
labour market. On the other hand, illness may cause other adults in the 
household not to participate in the labour market, given that they may have to 
care for the ill or because they benefit from this grant. Increased receipts from 
child support grants actually saw the likelihood of labour force participation by 
adult members of affected households increase. This may the result of the 
relatively small size of this grant compared to the other grants (R170 per 
month). Such small transfer, therefore, does not create a significant disincentive 
effect in the presence of no changes in receipts from other social grants. 
 
In the case of discouraged worker effects, increased disability grant receipts saw 
the likelihood of discouragement decline. However, one would have expected 
discouragement to increase as receipts from social grants increase. None of the 
other social grants affected the likelihood of non-participation or 
discouragement significantly. Thus, there is little evidence of social grants 
impacting negatively on labour force participation in affected households. 
 
 
 
  36
Table 12: Impact of social grants on decisions on labour force 
participation 
 
Independent 
variables 
Employed Unemployed Labour force 
participant 
Discouraged 
worker 
Old-age 
pension*1000 
-0.510** 0.022 -0.200 -0.171 
Child support 
grant*1000 
-0.367 1.495** 1.604** -0.760 
Disability 
grant*1000 
-1.245** -0.364** -0.742** -1.571** 
Foster care 
grant*1000 
0.158 -0.102 -0.036 0.032 
Gender 0.086 -0.061 -0.028 0.090 
Age 0.028** -0.003 0.012** 0.000 
Education (years) 0.025 0.016 0.022 0.027 
Rural place of 
residence 
-0.084 0.140 -0.009 0.486** 
Household size -0.063 0.092** 0.025 0.145** 
Children aged 0-5 
years 
0.097 -0.085 0.034 -0.248* 
Children aged 6-15 
years 
0.093 -0.190** -0.107** -0.188* 
Children aged 16-
18 years 
-0.062 -0.234** -0.271** 0.093 
Children aged 19-
21 years 
-0.095 -0.086 -0.085 -0.089 
Children aged 22-
24 years 
0.173* -0.174** -0.067 0.020 
Constant -1.783** -0.253 -0.009 -3.398 
Number of 
observations (n) 
1076 1076 1076 1076 
LR Chi2 statistic (P) 121.27 
(P<0.001) 
48.57 
(P<0.001) 
104.48 
(P<0.001) 
29.60 
(P<0.001) 
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.032 0.070 0.098 
 
Notes: Results are for pooled probit regressions. Dependent variables are 0/1 dummies for each of the 
different labour market outcomes. The results of the regression analysis that employed grant recipient 
status rather than grant income as independent variables yielded similar results to those presented here. 
Coefficients with two asterisks are statistically significant at the 95% level and coefficients with one 
asterisk are statistically significant at the 90% level. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper emphasises the important role of social grants in mitigating the socio-
economic impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Affected households in general 
and those affected households that have experienced a greater burden of 
morbidity and mortality in particular were more dependent on social grants 
compared to households that have not experienced morbidity or mortality. Given 
the pro-poor bias in the sampling design, relatively large proportions of 
households had access social grants. The evidence on access to social grants 
presented here emphasises the likely importance of the child support, disability 
and foster care grants in mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS, given that 
increased eligibility for these grants is driven largely by the increasing burden of 
chronic illness, the mounting orphan crisis and the impoverishment of 
households associated with the epidemic. Yet, take-up rates for child support, 
disability and foster care grants remain relatively low. Although the social 
welfare system in some sense is often seen as the panacea to various socio-
economic impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, many poor households remain 
beyond the grasp of the social safety-net. Hence, much scope remains to 
improve take-up rates for social grants. 
 
As expected, the probability of non-uptake of social grants amongst affected 
households in most cases declined as entitlement to benefit increased, i.e. as the 
degree of poverty increased, especially in the case of the larger social grants. 
There is also evidence of duration effects. The probability of non-uptake 
declined as the number of years of education of the household increased, which 
supports the argument that uptake increases as earnings potential increases. 
There is some evidence of application cost effects. Non-uptake of child support 
grants was much more likely in rural areas compared to urban areas. In addition, 
urban, affected households received more income in the form of foster care 
grants compared to rural, affected households. As argued above, application 
costs may be higher in rural than in urban places of residence, given that rural 
areas are more remote and offices of the Department of Home Affairs and Social 
Development, which are situated mainly in urban areas, are less accessible due 
to distance and associated transport and other costs. This raises particular 
questions as to how access to foster care grants can be improved in remote, rural 
areas. There is little evidence of social grants creating disincentives for people to 
participate in the labour market, except that is for disability grants, which saw 
the probability of labour force participation decline. 
 
Social grants play an important role in alleviating poverty. As expected, 
households that had gained access to social grants, especially the relatively 
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larger grants, were more likely to have gotten ahead. Not surprisingly, the child 
support grant, the smallest of these grants, did not consistently aid households in 
escaping poverty. Reductions in the incidence, depth and severity of poverty 
since baseline were considerable, both in affected households and in households 
that have not experienced morbidity or mortality. Importantly, though, the rate 
of poverty reduction continued to increase over time in affected households. 
This saw the gap in the incidence, depth and severity of poverty between 
affected households and households that have not experienced morbidity or 
mortality decline over time. Most importantly, the reductions in the severity of 
poverty since baseline were statistically significant in the case of affected 
households. Therefore, social grants play an important role in alleviating poverty 
(bringing very poor people closer to the poverty line), more so than eradicating 
poverty (lifting people out of poverty). In addition, income received from a 
number of social grants saw expenditure on food increase in affected 
households. However, affected households do not appear to employ income 
receipts in the form of social grants to pay for education, apart that is from old-
age pensions. Given that many orphaned and other children live in households 
headed by their grandparents, these transfers targeted at the elderly may benefit 
children indirectly. This raises the question as to whether grants aimed at 
benefiting children should rather be administered via the education system in 
order to ensure that these transfers benefit children in a more direct way, e.g. by 
paying for school fees or funding a nutrition programme at schools. 
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